Argentina and the law of the dumb fraction
The results of the recent elections in Argentina (the first round of the presidential elections) offer a vivid illustration of a general idea I presented in the previous post. Let’s present the idea in a very simple form, which I call the law of the dumb fraction: when the fraction of the population in a country with values of those individual characteristics that make an advanced society possible, falls below some critical threshold, then a vicious circle starts, that makes further falls inevitable. I call this fraction the dumb fraction to make explicit the parallel with the smart fraction theory, and to point to one very important characteristic, intelligence. But these characteristics include, but are not limited to, intelligence.
The fall is associated with a persistent and increasing political power of the progressive parties, even in spite of catastrophic results produced by the policies of the left. In the past, economic and social chaos, associated for instance with increasing criminality, was producing a reaction (sometimes reactionary) that was stopping the deterioration of the situation. Politics was looking like a pendulum, and the countries were moving from left to right to left, and then back to right when the excesses were too damaging for the average citizen. This is, by and large, no longer the case.
What happens now is a further fall. The further fall comes because the progressive political parties (the left) in the country acquire an even larger position of power, which in turn induces further immigration from regions with even lower values, and emigration of the population. This makes the economic and social situation even worse for people with higher values of those characteristics, who either leave (when they can) for other countries or look .
There is a fundamental transformation that has occurred in the last half century that explains this change. When a society is homogeneous, people that suffer from disastrous policies (mainly redistribution and regulations) are the vast majority, and very few have to gain. In a non-homogenous society, people who are less advantaged have more to gain from disastrous leftist policies than from sane conservative ones.
Argentina: the current politics
Let’s look at the facts. The immediate event is the temporary victory of the Peronist party (this time; the runoff is on November 19, and we will follow it closely). The right, divided in the two fractions, has failed to secure a success that the polls were anticipating. Why?
A rough parallel with the situation in the United States may clarify the situation. It is a simplification, but it captures some of the substance of the situation. Javier Milei is roughly in the position of Trump and Patricia Bullrich in that of the establishment Republican party. From the tactical point of view, the right may appear to have made the tactical mistake of entering the fight divided: Milei received 30 percent of the votes, Bullrich 23, against the 36 of the Peronist winner, Sergio Massa.
Massa became minister of the economy in July 2022. After a little more than one year, the situation is catastrophic, with an economy in intensive care, in all relevant measures: inflation, interest rate, exchange rate (the real one as well as the fake governmental one), reserved, GDP. Still, Massa went on to win the first turn. To understand why, we need to look deeper, at the structural facts affecting political life.
Argentina: the long run evolution
Argentina has been in the last two decades (after the 2001 economic crisis) a crystal clear example of the vicious circle. It has had an immigration from countries in Latin America, from regions that have economic conditions so bad that migrating to Argentina and its rudimentary but generous welfare system is an improvement. At the same time, it is losing populations to richer countries, mostly to the European countries from which their ancestors came (Spain and Italy, mostly, but also Germany and England). The combined effects of this immigration and emigration is destroying Argentina. As we write, there are more families of Italian or Spanish origin that are planning to get that citizenship that will perhaps allow them to live in a sane country. If you live in the greater Buenos Aires and you and your family have been, and plan to be, out of work for years, you have more to get from another Peronist than from any attempt to put the financial house in order. This principle is what we learned from the failed presidency of Mauricio Macri between 2015 and 2019.
Implications of the law.
What do we conclude from this? Intellectuals on the right in the United States are thinking, very cleverly, to play Alinsky against the radicals on the left, or even better to play Gramsci against the heirs of the communists. There is going to be, we are told, a long march through the institutions, but this time for the good of conservative, free market, libertarian ideas. This can be done in the cultural arena (as Rufo suggests) or in the political and institutional arena (Hanania).
It looks like a very clever scheme. Having lost a political battle, Gramsci proposed to fight the battle on the cultural level, because politics is downstream from culture. The political right claims to have the lesson that politics is downstream from culture, and is now fighting the right decisive battle, the decisive one.
It is too bad, really, that the progressives have (a long time ago; with a first insight in the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act) already shifted to a different strategy, that of permanently altering the composition of the population. The left knows well that if politics is downstream from culture, culture is downstream from genetics. The Argentinian elections show that the left is now fighting and winning the decisive battle, while the either side is either asleep or fighting tanks with cavalry. Time to wake up.